### 1AC Solvency Core

#### China will trade *significant reductions* in military presence – but not without leverage – the plan locks in regional stability, leads to a political solution without reunification, and avoids nuclear war over Taiwan

Gross, senior associate of Pacific Forum CSIS, a non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former director of legislative affairs at the NSC, former counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 2012

(Donald, *The China Fallacy*, p.161-162)

If China were to permanently eliminate the missiles facing Taiwan, while significantly and verifiably reducing and redeploying the air and naval forces currently threatening the island, Taiwan's security would be markedly improved. This outcome can be achieved through mutual threat reduction measures that reduce, eliminate and redeploy advanced weapons and military equipment that either Taiwan or China could employ in the event of conflict. Such measures would make it far more difficult for either side to threaten or intimidate the other for political purposes, in addition to significantly lowering their capacity to wreak destruction during an actual war.

Because Taiwan is now militarily inferior to China with regard to missiles, naval vessels and air force assets, it lacks the diplomatic leverage to eliminate the security threat that China poses. Short of agreeing to reunification—which is currently opposed by a majority of Taiwan's citizens—there are no measures Taiwan can offer as a sufficient quid pro quo to secure significant Chinese arms reductions. And, without reciprocal security measures, China refuses to engage in what it considers “unilateral disarmament.”

By contrast, the U.S. is capable of securing a drastic reduction in China's military threat to Taiwan by offering reciprocal military measures that would lead to far greater stability in the region, creating a transformed regional security environment. China is highly likely to reduce, redeploy and eliminate its missile, naval and air forces now threatening the island, in exchange for the U.S. pulling back forces **now engaged in surveillance and patrolling of Chinese territory**, significantly reducing U.S. military deployments in the Asia Pacific, and scaling down major arms sales to Taiwan.

It is also important to recall that Taiwan's prior negotiations with China on long-term political issues reflect the profound difficulty the two sides face in reaching an agreement that could truly stabilize their relations for the foreseeable future. Taiwan understandably fears being absorbed by China, knowing full well that Beijing's foremost objective is national reunification at the earliest possible time. A large majority of Taiwan's people reject Beijing's promise to guarantee the island's autonomy and democratic political system through a so-called “one country, two systems” formula. For its part, China worries that Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), though currently out of power, could strongly re-emerge in the future, and once again lead a drive for political independence which effectively thwarts national reunification.

A Framework Agreement would strengthen the security of Taiwan and the preservation of its democratic political system without requiring it to agree to eventual reunification with China. It would be entirely up to the Taiwanese government and people whether to conduct bilateral negotiations on political reunification at some future time. The two sides would be able to carry out their negotiations in a largely non-threatening and stable security environment, which would help support, in and of itself, a successful agreement on difficult political issues.

Eliminating the Risk of a U.S.-China military conflict

The proposed security measures in a Framework Agreement would end the current military standoff over Taiwan as well as the broader friction arising from aggressive U.S. air and sea surveillance along China's coast. Whenever China-Taiwan relations become acrimonious—as they typically do when the Taiwanese political party favoring independence is in power or when Chinese leaders play to nationalist public opinion and threaten a future attack on the island—it greatly heightens the security risks that the U.S. faces in Asia. In the event of an imminent or actual attack on Taiwan, the U.S. would almost certainly send military forces to the island's aid, with proponents of intervention citing U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. National security strategists would argue that a military response is essential to ensure the credibility of the overall U.S. security posture in Asia, particularly the defense commitments to Japan and South Korea.

The current standoff over Taiwan effectively puts the U.S. at the mercy of political elements in China and Taiwan that seek to achieve their goals without regard for U.S. interests. Those interests include both protecting Taiwan and avoiding a war with China that could conceivably escalate to a nuclear exchange. By realizing a Framework Agreement with China that protects Taiwan's democracy, stabilizes the region and eliminates the risk of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. would greatly advance its core policy objectives.

#### The aff avoids the allied assurance and China containment das – reduces fears of expansion – unilateral cps fail

Glaser, professor of political science at George Washington University and international affairs and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, Spring 2015

(Charles L., "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" *International Security* Volume 39, Number 4, Project Muse)

U.S. accommodation of China deserves serious analysis for two reasons. First, both intuition and international relations theory suggest that a rising power, especially one that has experienced tremendous growth, can reasonably expect to increase its geopolitical influence and more fully achieve its goals, especially when these goals involve its national security. Bargaining theories maintain that the probability of war is greater when there is a larger disparity between the distribution of benefits in the existing territorial status quo and the balance of power.3 Accommodation that reduces this disparity can, under some conditions, reduce the probability of war and increase the declining state’s security.

Second, the pressures created by the international structure—the combination of material and information conditions that constrain states’ international options—should allow China to rise peacefully, which, somewhat counterintuitively, increases the potential importance of accommodation. If the international structure were driving the United States and China toward a major conflict, the concessions required of the United States would be extremely large and costly. Even then, they might do little to moderate the intense competition. But, because the international structure is not creating such intense pressures, concessions that do not compromise vital U.S. interests may have the potential to greatly diminish growing strains in U.S.-China relations, thereby moderating future military and foreign policy competition between the two powers.

More concretely, regional dangers dwarf international structural dangers. Northeast Asia is plagued by territorial and maritime disputes that are straining political relations both within the region and across the Pacific. Only one of these disputes—China’s opposition to U.S. involvement in protecting Taiwan—seems important enough to possibly bring the United States and China into conflict. Even Taiwan, however, is a secondary, albeit not insignificant, U.S. interest. Other lesser disputes are currently roiling China’s relationships with many of its neighbors, but none appear sufficiently significant [End Page 50] that they should derail China’s peaceful rise. Nevertheless, recent events demonstrate that even these seemingly minor disputes—for example, over the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—can have an outsized negative impact on U.S.-China relations. Thus, the question arises whether accommodation on Taiwan and possibly these still less important issues would help keep China’s rise peaceful, while the United States continued to effectively protect its vital interests in the region.

Accommodation could bring risks of its own. For example, it would jeopardize U.S. security if it were to convince China that the United States lacked the resolve to protect its vital national interests, leading China to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. This danger would be especially large if, instead of limited aims, China desired regional hegemony and was determined to force the United States out of East Asia. Accommodation might also raise serious concerns among U.S. allies—most importantly, Japan—about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, thereby undermining alliances that are widely judged to be essential to the security of the United States. Finally, ending the United States’ commitment to Taiwan could sacrifice important U.S. nonsecurity interests, including support for democracy and individual liberties, with no guarantee of benefits in return.

The grand bargain I propose is designed to capture the benefits of U.S. accommodation with China, while reducing its risks. China’s concessions on its territorial and maritime disputes would communicate information to the United States about the limited extent of its aims, thereby reducing Washington’s concern that its own concessions would encourage China to push the United States out of East Asia. In addition, resolution of these disputes would eliminate flash points that fuel regional military competition and crises that could draw the United States into a war.

### QPQ – Reciprocity Key

#### The aff leads to a spiral of cooperation – but reciprocity is key

Goldstein, associate professor and founding director, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, May 2015

(Lyle, *Meeting China Halfway*, pg. 12-14)

In addition to the commonsense methodological approach of surveying a wide body of Chinese-language writings, this book also presents the conceptual innovation of “cooperation spirals,” in order to provide bilateral policy “moves” for achieving substantive progress in US-China relations across a range of difficult issues. A cooperation spiral may be considered the precise opposite of an escalation spiral— which is frequently interpreted as the result of fear and misperception when leaders confront security dilemmas. 41 In a cooperation spiral, trust and confidence are built over time through incremental and reciprocal steps that gradually lead to larger and more significant compromises. To be sure, these proposed steps will be difficult— and thus their related challenges are fully analyzed in the chapters that follow— but their gradual, evolutionary, and reciprocal nature make them a feasible guide for practitioners.

Unfortunately, the leading journals in East Asian international relations, such as Asian Survey and International Security, appear to neglect the issue of how to foster US-China cooperation. 42 Alternatively, academic journals that do take international cooperation as their focus, such as Conflict Management and Peace Science, have tended to disregard the issue of China, and US-China relations in particular. A veritable intellectual chasm has therefore seemed to open up with respect to fresh scholarship on how Beijing and Washington might cooperate in the twenty-first century.

Nevertheless, a number of relevant insights from the quite extensive theoretical debate— which generally pits “neoliberals” against “neorealists”— regarding the nature of cooperation in world politics are summarized here. Two pioneers in the study of international cooperation, Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, warn at the outset that “achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics, … [where] cheating and deception are endemic.” They highlight the importance of the “mutuality of interests,” as expressed in “payoff structures,” the “shadow of the future,” and the number of actors involved. Each of these issues is pertinent to the prospects for US-China cooperation, given that one may evaluate whether Beijing and Washington indeed prefer “mutual cooperation” to “mutual defection,” because that cannot be assumed. They emphasize, moreover, that the “mutuality of interests is not based simply on objective factors, but is grounded upon the actors’ perception of their own interests. Perceptions define interests.” These scholars evaluate both the possibilities and risks of “issue linkage” in facilitating cooperation, and also the likely constraints posed by domestic politics. They appear to offer strong support for the proposed cooperation spiral model, when they assert that “a strategy based on reciprocity— such as tit for tat— can be remarkably effective in promoting cooperation, … even among pure egoists.” Still, even these foremost advocates of cooperation are quite cognizant that attempts at reciprocity can devolve into “acrimonious and frustrating patterns of bargaining,” but also that the most effective motive for cooperation between rivals in world politics has generally been the “activities of a third power.” 43 Cheating and the problem of relative gains also pose significant challenges for policymakers that seek mutual accommodation by employing cooperation spirals. Nevertheless, Asia specialists are still very much intrigued by the possibilities for reinvigorated engagement, as one scholar explained in the summer of 2013 in the leader article of Global Asia: “Engagement invites reciprocity, thus setting in motion a succession of positive changes in policy and outlook quite opposite from the ladder of escalation that characterizes all too many international conflicts.” 44

#### Reciprocity key to break negotiating deadlock

Goldstein, associate professor and founding director, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, May 2015

(Lyle, *Meeting China Halfway*, pg. 12-14)

The cooperation spiral model, as applied in this book across a wide variety of difficult policy dilemmas in US-China relations, **draws on all major traditions in international relations theory**. From the constructivist tradition, the model relies on the conception that **ideas and norms have force unto themselves,** and therefore **creative diplomacy** and focused leadership **can potentially** break divisive deadlocks **and** prevent the tragedy of great power conflict. From the liberal tradition, the model adopts certain precepts related to processes, and specifically to those institutions that can guide expectations and behavior— thus building trust and enabling further cooperation. Finally, though in somewhat obvious contradiction to realist predictions of rivalry, the cooperation spiral also takes certain realist principles as essential, including the principles that cooperative measures must be consistent with state interests, must accord with tendencies in the balance of power, and must also be reciprocal in nature to the extent possible. Therefore, the proposed model also represents a realist form of cooperation. Stimulating a wider discussion of alternative steps within the proposed cooperation spirals would constitute, in itself, a major contribution to this field. After all, this author hardly purports to be Moses with a Hundred Commandments. The twin key points of this approach are that reciprocity is necessary and that practical first steps must be found. The endpoints only seem utopian in the absence of the accomplishments that result from climbing the earlier steps, and even if the endpoints remain out of reach, **each step represents a** significant advance. For instance, the European Union could not have emerged except at the end of a path of cooperation that began with small and tentative cooperative efforts that proved themselves intrinsically useful. 48

### 1AC Nuclear Modernization Adv.

#### Close range US surveillance assets, that the plan removes, drive China’s perceptions of threatening strategic capabilities—causes nuclear arms races

Gregory Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists, China Project Manager in the Global Security Program, July 2014, Chinese Concerns About US Missile Defense, http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/china-missile-defense.pdf

There is, however, a very pronounced concern about being able to protect China’s conventional missile forces from a possible preemptive strike, either against the missiles themselves or against their command and control systems. **The radars the U**nited **S**tates **is deploying in the region**, including **those that support missile defense, are a** significant concern **for Chinese military planners**, as are the satellites the United States can use to identify, track and strike potential Chinese targets. Wu Riqiang, a technically trained Chinese security analyst from People’s University, argues the U.S. radars in the region associated with its missile defense program, when used to observe Chinese missile testing programs, could provide U.S. observers with useful information on the capabilities of Chinese missiles and missile defense countermeasures (Wu 2013). When discussing U.S. reports of a Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile, Wu hypothesized that China might be reluctant to test the missile because of the possibility of unnecessarily exposing information about the missile.

In sum, when assessing Chinese concerns about the effect of U.S. missile defense on its conventional missiles, **there seems to be a greater concern about the** ancillary **intelligence** gathering **and** **surveillance activities** of the United States during peacetime **than there is about the ability of the defenses to intercept a Chinese missile fired during an actual conflict.**

Maturing Concerns

In a series of interviews on Chinese perspectives on U.S. missile defense conducted in the spring of 2014, all of the Chinese respondents indicated China was taking a “wait and see” approach to current U.S. plans. Although the United States claims these plans are targeted at North Korea, Chinese observers, in keeping with past practice, remain concerned that U.S. investments in missile defense, and its cooperation on missile defense with other nations on China’s periphery, could pose a potential long term challenge to China’s national security.

At the same time, China is beginning to experiment with its own missile defense technology. China tested the same interceptor employed in the January 2007 destruction of one of its own satellites in a missile defense mode in 2010 and again in 2013. Although both tests were declared successful, the interviews conducted for this paper confirm that Chinese experimentation with missile defense technology is leading to a greater awareness of its limitations. This awareness, especially because it is a product of China’s own research, development and testing, is reducing Chinese anxieties about the threat missile defense might present to Chinese missile forces, both nuclear and conventional.

However, Chinese arms control analysts still see the continued U.S. pursuit of missile defense, and its unwillingness to engage in any substantive discussion of limitations on the development of this technology, as an assault on the foundation of international efforts to move towards nuclear disarmament. In the words of one of China’s most influential arms control experts:

“Historically, limitations on the development of strategic missile defense systems were a cornerstone of nuclear arms control. **The development of strategic missile defense not only easily** facilitates nuclear arms racing**; it** poisons relations **between the nuclear nations,** destroys strategic stability **and makes** deep **nuclear reductions difficult to realize** (Sun 2010, p. 18).”

Chinese analysts interpreted the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile ABM Treaty, which had imposed limits on missile defenses for an unlimited duration, as an indication that the United States was no longer serious about nuclear disarmament. Since building up offensive forces is a clear way to overwhelm defenses, limiting defenses has long been recognized as an important element of limiting the number of offensive forces. The Obama administration’s commitment to U.S. plans for missile defense reconfirmed Chinese perceptions—prevalent since the Clinton administration—that there was a bipartisan consensus within the United States government in favor of continuing to pursue missile defense technology, despite its negative implications for nuclear disarmament.

Concluding Remarks

China is making large investments and significant progress in advanced military technology, especially in missile, space, and related areas, including antisatellite weapons and missile defense. Nevertheless, Chinese analysts think they lag behind the United States, which they believe continues to make even larger investments, and more rapid progress, in developing these same technologies.

China’s national defense policy, particularly its investments in advanced military technology like missile defense, is driven by long-standing Chinese anxieties about falling behind in a technological competition with more powerful nations. These anxieties have played an outsized role in shaping Chinese thinking about technology and national defense since

China's defeat in the Opium War of 1840. In the absence of substantive discussions with the United States and other nations about negotiating verifiable limits on missile defense and related technologies, China will continue to keep a close watch on U.S. advances and to invest in the research and development of similar, though not necessarily identical, capabilities. Chinese defense planners may not intend to deploy such systems. The primary purpose of their research and development efforts is to provide China with a detailed understanding of the technology and its potential capabilities and implications.

**As long as this technological back and forth** between China and the United States **continues, progress in missile defense will** continue to **cause Chinese defense planners to** consider **expand**ing **the size of China’s small nuclear arsenal and** may **lend credibility to** the **arguments of those advocating** such **increases during Chinese internal debates**. Because China associates strategic missile defense with nuclear arms racing, **continued U.S. investment in** strategic **missile defense** **undermines Chinese interest in entering discussions** **with the U**nited **S**tates and other nuclear weapons states on deeper nuclear reductions. It also erodes Chinese confidence in the U.S. commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which obliges all nuclear weapons states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Most importantly, the **U.S. focus on missile defense** and **technologies** that could target Chinese missiles suggests, to many Chinese analysts, **that U.S. leaders still hope to deny China a nuclear retaliatory capability in order to exert nuclear coercion**. **This sows distrust and resentment that undermines bilateral dialog on reducing the threat of nuclear war**.

#### Doctrinal mismatch leads to massive strategic instability

Caitlin Talmadge, FEBRUARY 2016, “Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.–China Conflict,” INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY AND CONFLICT STUDIES; Caitlin Talmadge is the Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University, and a member of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies. Her areas of expertise include defense policy, civil-military relations, U.S. military operations and strategy, nuclear proliferation, and Persian Gulf security issues. Has an A.B., Harvard College and a Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; A.A.

Five factors suggest that a U.S.–China conventional war could activate this escalatory mechanism.¶ **First, the United States embraces highly offensive conventional concepts of operations in the Pacific, despite the nuclear pressures these approaches might place on China.** A U.S. campaign in a conventional war with China could target Chinese submarines, missile sites, command and control systems, air defense networks, and other sites well inside the Chinese mainland. From China’s perspective these assets may be relevant to China’s assured retaliation capability. Thus what the United States may view as a purely conventional operation might look to China like the prelude to a counterforce strike, creating strong use-or-lose pressures. Indeed, some Chinese statements indicate that conventional attacks on China’s nuclear capabilities could vitiate China’s no-first-use pledge.¶ **Second, U.S. alliance commitments could further exacerbate this danger.** The Pacific Ocean may insulate the United States from much of China’s striking power, but U.S. allies, particularly Japan and Taiwan, would be much more militarily and economically exposed in the event of a U.S.–China war. Even if the United States believed it could achieve security through a slower and more limited conventional campaign, U.S. allies might not share that conviction. This reality again suggests that U.S. conventional operations could quickly expand in ways that could appear to impinge on Chinese nuclear capabilities.¶ **Third, the U.S. military’s organizational tendencies also tilt in the direction of a more conventionally aggressive campaign.** For understandable reasons, militaries have a well-developed general preference for the offense. Militaries also tend to pursue tactical and operational advantages at the expense of broader strategic and political objectives. Historically this behavior has resulted in a U.S. approach that is very good at general deterrence (preventing the outbreak of war) but less adept at intra-war deterrence (that is, preventing ongoing wars from escalating).¶ **Fourth, civilian control of the U.S. military is** unlikely to check these tendencies**.** Some civilian policymakers may not be fully aware of the potentially escalatory implications of such approaches, while others may actually embrace these approaches. The historical record suggests that civilian oversight of conventional operations with nuclear implications has not always been robust.¶ **Fifth, situational awareness is likely to deteriorate** rapidly **for the United States and** especially **China during a conventional conflict, in ways that further** compound all of the escalatory pressures **just discussed.** After all, denying China knowledge of the battle space through the destruction of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets (ISR) and command and control networks is likely to be one of the primary objectives of any U.S. military strategy. These sorts of attacks will be essential to U.S. conventional success but also will make it increasingly difficult for China to feel confident that U.S. aims are limited and that China’s nuclear retaliatory capabilities remain intact. Similarly, the United States may cross Chinese nuclear tripwires without realizing it.

#### Strategic instability escalates all regional arms races and triggers their da impacts

Weitz, Director, Center for Political-Military Analysis, Hudson Institute, ‘15

(Richard, “Arms Racing in Strategic Technologies: Asia's New Frontier,” May 3, <http://www.hudson.org/research/11307-arms-racing-in-strategic-technologies-asia-s-new-frontier>)

Although China, Russia, and the United States have together experienced numerous crises and tensions since the end of the Cold War, one important reason that each state has refrained from employing military force directly against the others **is their robust nuclear deterrents and survivable “second-strike”** capabilities—their assured ability to retaliate effectively with their own nuclear forces even if they were attacked first. Furthermore, US extended nuclear security guarantees—Washington’s promise to protect its allies against nuclear threats with nuclear forces, if necessary—has dissuaded other potential nuclear weapons states, namely Japan and South Korea, from pursuing their own nuclear weapons capability. Despite doubts, these countries have continued to place their faith in Washington’s will and capacity to defend them against North Korea and other threats. However, new military technologies such as missile defenses, anti-satellite weapons, **and hypersonic missile systems, could raise the risks of nuclear weapons use in future crises, especially if accompanied by certain risk-acceptant operational concepts.** Ballistic missile defense (**BMD**) **systems may** convince their possessors that they could launch a disarming first strike—expecting their missile shields to protect them against any retaliatory strikes. Hypersonic delivery systems present new challenges for crisis stability due to their rapid speed and unpredictable flight paths. Furthermore, **states have incentives to use cyber weapons early in a conflict to exploit any vulnerabilities** of their opponent before their own can be neutralized by an enemy. **States may even consider launching their nuclear forces before they have been attacked**, such as on warning of an assault **despite the risks of** misperception **and** miscalculation**.**

Chinese and Russian officials have already complained about the allegedly disruptive nature of the expanding US capabilities **for missile defense**, precision strikes, and other strategic technologies. The strong US offensive capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, exacerbate these concerns since they increase its potential for successfully pre-empting Chinese and Russian nuclear missiles before they have been launched.2 Experts believe that the Chinese share Russian concerns about “conventional counterforce” – US preemptive attacks using non-nuclear hypersonic weapons or even cruise missiles against the PLA’s nuclear forces and command nodes and then using missile defenses to defeat any ragged Chinese counterstrike. Both countries are seeking to overcome US offensive and defensive capabilities by actively researching all these new strategic technologies for possible military application.

It is important not to exaggerate the potential for near-term technological breakthroughs in these capabilities. By their very nature, however, the pace and impact of these novel military weapons based on revolutionary capabilities are hard to predict. Few existing treaties explicitly constrain the quantitative or qualitative dimensions of these new strategic technologies. The best time to negotiate arms control agreements limiting the development of potentially destabilizing systems is before the weapons are deployed, but there are major impediments to progress in this area.

#### Advanced radar leads to rail-ICBMs and long range submarines – makes miscalc inevitable

David Gompert, professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval Academy and an adjunct fellow at the RAND Corporation, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, held a number of corporate executive and senior government positions, including Senior Advisor for National Security in Iraq, Deputy to the Under Secretary of State, Special Assistant to President George H. W. Bush, and Special Assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and Philip C. Saunders, PhD, Director of Studies for the Center for Strategic Research from 2010-12, ‘12

(*The Paradox of Power Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability*, pg. 81-83)

Using its surveillance capabilities to locate fixed Chinese ICBMs and, say, 500 of its nuclear warheads plus conventional global strike weapons in a first strike on China, the United States **could destroy most if not all of Chinas ICBMs** (along with a lot of the country and its people). If, for the sake of analysis, five Chinese ICBMs survived the U.S. strike and were launched in retaliation, the current U.S. BMD system of sensors and interceptors could potentially destroy them all (assuming it were optimized for the trajectories of Chinese ICBMs). **In the face of such odds, the Chinese would not have confidence** that any of their nuclear weapons would reach the United States. Conversely, the United States would have reasonable, though not absolute, confidence in its ability to conduct a first strike on China without suffering retaliation. However improbable that the United States would actually attack China with nuclear weapons, these odds could give the United States escalation dominance, which would disfavor China in how a nonnuclcar conflict between the two would be settled."**' Such dominance provides leverage not only in hostilities but also in crises.**

Deeming such a correlation of strategic forces to be both intolerable and correctable, the Chinese could in a few years take a number of remedial steps well within their current resource capacity and technological competence. **They could** increase **the number of** ICBMs from 50 to, say, 100, with the added ones all solid-fueled (enabling them to be launched faster) **and deployed on** mobile launchers **(making them harder to target)**.-1 In that case, perhaps not 5 but 20 Chinese ICBMs would survive a U.S. first strike, presenting U.S. BMD with a challenge near the upper end of its capability. At that point, the United States **would have much lower confidence** of avoiding Chinese nuclear retaliation altogether and so could be deterred.

In order to restore its ability to deny China a nuclear deterrent, the United States could respond by planning a significantly larger first strike of perhaps 1,000 of its nuclear weapons and a larger share of its conventional strike weapons**. In this desktop nuclear arms race**, such a move would have very high real and opportunity costs for the United States, by requiring other strategic missions to be neglected, enlarging its conventional global strike force, and perhaps exceeding the START limit of 1,550 on deployed strategic nuclear weapons. **The United States could also** expand its missile BMD to counter a medium-scale nuclear attack, **but also at considerable cost in sensors** and interceptors and the installations on which they are deployed.

Observing this U.S. response, **China could build and deploy still more mobile ICBMs** and accelerate current plans to build five strategic missile-carrying submarines, which, when deployed, are even harder to locate, track, and target than mobile missile launchers. In order to reach the continental United States, **the Chinese would need to** extend cither the patrol range of their submarines or the trajectory range of their strategic submarine-based missiles.21 The Chinese could also develop and field decoys and other penetration aids to frustrate U.S. BMD. Finally, **the Chinese could develop and arm their strategic missiles with MIRVs**. All these moves are within China's expanding economic means and technological reach.

Now facing, say, 100 or more incoming weapons, plus decoys, the United States could further enhance its missile defense to counter a large-scale attack, requiring more bases for sensors and interceptors as well as more ships for seaborne missile defense. The United States could also expand its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and operations, requiring still more surface ships and attack submarines and/or committing more of the U.S. Navy to this instead of other critical missions. The United States could also attempt to enhance its space-based capabilities for more comprehensive real-time surveillance of China in order to track and target mobile missile launchers.

#### Also triggers hypersonic arms racing – goes nuclear – strategic restraint is key

Yousaf Butt, nuclear physicist, is a visiting senior research fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University in Washington, 12/3/15, The Hypersonic Arms Race Is Going Nuclear -- Take Note, [www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/hypersonic-nuclear-arms-race\_b\_8700510.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/hypersonic-nuclear-arms-race_b_8700510.html)

\*HGV = Hypersonic boost-glide

A new type of high-speed arms race is heating up between the U.S., Russia and China -- **and it's threatening to go nuclear.** Washington had always intended for the new "hypersonic boost-glide" weapons to remain purely conventional, but Russia **and China seem to be pursuing nuclear variants.** If the hypersonic arms race heads in a nuclear direction, **Washington may be pressured to follow**. Luckily, these new weapons systems are still in their fledgling state, so there's still some time to establish international norms. Washington, Moscow and Beijing ought to call a timeout on hypersonic glide vehicle testing and start talking frankly about the risks of the hypersonic arms race going nuclear.

The story begins right after the 9/11 attacks when some voices in the U.S. national security community called for fielding new conventionally armed long-range ballistic missiles to address time sensitive "niche" threats -- like terrorists at hideouts halfway around the world. The traditional nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile were seen as overkill and too self-deterring to use on such targets of opportunity. But it was mainly because Russia and China could confuse conventionally armed missiles with their nuclear counterparts that Congress initially withheld support for this "Conventional Prompt Global Strike" mission -- the danger of unwittingly starting a nuclear war with Russia or China was seen as too great.

In the meantime, an alternate incarnation has gained traction: the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle concept. Because the boost-glide trajectory is vastly different from the traditional parabolic path nuclear-tipped missiles follow, it's thought that a conventional HGV strike is not likely to be confused with a nuclear ICBM attack (see figure below).

Basically, after they're released from their rocket-booster, these weapons skim near the top of the atmosphere at speeds greater than 4,000 mph, gliding and maneuvering to their targets with high precision, instead of following a parabolic path like ballistic missiles. Russia and China are also in on the game but -- importantly -- may not be restricting themselves to conventional weaponry on their HGVs.

**This HGV mission creep from** conventional to nuclear **should be nipped in the bud**. If not, it may increase the risk of stumbling into a nuclear war -- **the risk of** accidental nuclear war **is already high enough without introducing high-speed and stealthy nuclear HGVs into the mix.**

Russia, in particular, may be motivated to develop nuclear warheads for its HGVs because such nukes would not count against the limits negotiated in the New START treaty. **Nuclear HGVs would have essentially no arms-control constraints.**

Not only that, but the flight profile of HGVs **provides a** natural immunity **from U.S. ballistic missile defenses** which have preoccupied Russian and Chinese military planners for decades. Because HGVs typically fly at less than 100 kilometer altitude, **they are more difficult to detect by the long-range radars** used to cue strategic missile defenses. This low altitude also happens to be well below the region where the midcourse ballistic missile defense interceptors work: **HGVs will** simply underfly **American strategic missile defense**s that attempt to intercept the warheads in space (>100 kilometer altitude). On top of that, the HGVs are maneuverable, which makes finding a firing solution for any type of defense virtually impossible.

Though new types of missile defenses like the THAAD-ER are being investigated to try to address the HGV threat they could, at best, only protect limited regions of the country in the vicinity of a THAAD battery. And even these **new missile defenses could be** defeated **by decoys and by maneuverability just like the present midcourse and terminal systems.**

Luckily, HGV technology is very complex and the vehicles are still in the developmental and testing phase, so **there is still some time to discuss international norms** governing their use. Strategic restraint here **could benefit all the players**.

The difficulty of mastering the technology is evident by the various failed tests in the U.S., Russia and China. A notable U.S. success was the Army's Advanced Hypersonic Weapon: it was successfully tested in 2011, flying from Kauai, Hawaii and hitting its target at the Reagan Test Site on the Marshall Islands, 3,700 kilometers away. But there have also been several test failures -- HGV development is clearly still in its infancy.

The Chinese evidently have the best HGV test record so far: they've tested their DF-ZF (aka WU-14) HGV prototype six times in the past two years with only one reported failure. The latest Chinese DF-ZF test was just last week and was yet another success. The Russian test record has been more spotty, with all tests of their Yu-71 HGV in the past few years having reportedly failed.

Nonetheless, Russian ambitions for the HGV remain undimmed with Jane's Intelligence Review claiming that, "Russia appears to be considering the option of deploying its hypersonic system in a nuclear, as well as conventional, configuration," by the 2020-2025 timeframe. Given that Russian nuclear HGVs would not count against the limits agreed to in the New START treaty -- and presumably in any follow-on treaty -- it would make sense for them to plan to field such nuclear weapons.

HGVs are fast, difficult to detect and virtually impossible to defend against. In times of tension, it may be tempting to use HGVs to preemptively take out an adversary's offensive capability: for instance the U.S. may decide to target an adversary's ground-based anti-satellite weapon sites. In fact, this is among the "five representative scenarios" outlined in a 2009 Defense Science Board report. But because of the well-known compressed HGV timelines, **the adversary may preemptively use their ASATs** -- a classic case of crisis instability ("Use-it-or-lose-it") **due to the** short timescales **involved**.

So the effect of the openly advertised compressed timelines for HGVs systems on competitor states' doctrines should be critically examined lest these new weapons systems result in a net decrease in U.S. security. Ironically, if the HGV arms race goes nuclear, this would obviate the reason we had for developing these weapons in the first place: to be able to tell apart nuclear from conventional delivery platforms by the very different trajectories. If HGVs go nuclear, a**ll long-range missile trajectories could be seen as potentially nuclear** by an adversary or competitor state.

Bans on HGV testing have already been proposed. Such arms control measures should be seriously considered -- but even if such test bans are not eventually adopted, the U.S., Russia and China could agree to some international norms keeping HGVs strictly conventional. And there's a collateral economic benefit: billions of dollars could be saved by sensibly scaling back the pursuit of nuclear HGVs.

The various arms control treaties negotiated between the U.S. and Soviets during the Cold War era -- and with Russia afterwards -- **illustrate how** strategic restraint can trump the short-term tactical advantages **driven by technological exuberance**. The last thing the world needs is a fast, stealthy, expensive and massively destructive nuclear weapon system on hair-trigger. The time to act is now.

### Mod – Aff Solves

#### Aff’s reciprocal reduction in surveillance assets cements Chinese arms control

Kulacki, China project manager and senior analyst, UCS, ‘14

(Gregory, “Evolving Chinese Views on U.S. National Missile Defense,” <http://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/evolving-chinese-views-on-u-s-national-missile-defense>)

The current focus of Chinese concern appears to be on the ancillary intelligence gathering and surveillance capabilities the United States is putting in place **during peacetime rather than the ability of U.S. defenses to intercept a Chinese missile** fired during an actual conflict. Chinese military planners worry—justifiably or not—that the radars the United States is deploying in the region, including those that support missile defense, **could be used to observe the testing or track the deployments of Chinese missiles**. Combined with intensive U.S. monitoring of Chinese missile forces with satellites, and the U.S. refusal to take any military option including a nuclear first strike “off the table,” Chinese military planners confront what some perceive as **an uncomfortably high risk of a disarming U.S. preemptive strike,** either against the missiles themselves or against their command and control systems.

From China’s perspective, continued U.S. investments in a national missile defense present a **serious challenge to the efforts of both sides to maintain strategic stability** between China and the United States over the long term. The U.S. pursuit of a shield against nuclear attacks undermines Chinese confidence in U.S. assurances **that greater Chinese transparency about its comparatively small nuclear arsenal would not undermine Chinese security**. And China’s refusal to discuss the size and capabilities of its nuclear forces undermines U.S. confidence in Chinese assurances that China will not build up its nuclear forces as the United States and Russia scale down, or threaten to use its nuclear weapons during a future conflict with the United States.

Technological vs. Negotiated Solutions

Despite three decades of research and development, the United States has yet to produce an effective reliable defense against long-range ballistic missiles. But President Reagan’s 1983 decision to invest in this defense, which he promised would make nuclear-armed missiles “obsolete,” did spur the Chinese leadership to launch its own large scale, long-term investment in advanced military technologies, including kinetic energy interceptors like those being developed for the U.S. national missile defense program.

China has tested its own kinetic energy interceptors using missiles and a satellite as targets. In January 2007 the Chinese used the interceptor to obliterate an aging Chinese weather satellite, creating a large field of potentially dangerous debris that will remain in space for decades. China described its most recent test of this exoatmospheric hit-to-kill technology, conducted just last week, as a missile defense test. Chinese press reports compared the test to an 11 January 2010 test, which is described in detail in a U.S. cable issued the following day.

President Reagan’s technological utopianism, which, ironically, is also defining feature of Chinese Marxism, **lives on among U.S. defense analysts** who continue to believe national missile defense is a solution to the danger of nuclear-armed missiles. Common sense, as well as experience, suggests that a new defense merely begets a new offense, and in the case of national missile defense, countermeasures that can be easily added to missiles to defeat missile defenses are a lot simpler and much less expensive to successfully develop and deploy, even for technology-starved nations like Iran and North Korea.

The women and men who work in China’s defense science community understand the limiting technical realities of the U.S. national missile defense program. Throughout the history of the People’s Republic, China’s senior political leaders looked to their scientists and engineers for definitive guidance on Chinese nuclear weapons policy. These technically trained professionals see the continued U.S. pursuit of a national missile defense as antithetical to international efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. For them, missile defense is a security problem, not a solution, even though they now possess the same basic technology themselves.

In the words of one of China’s most influential arms control experts, who works in a center affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics,

“Historically, **limitations on the development of strategic missile defense systems were a** cornerstone of nuclear arms control**.** The development of strategic missile defense **not only easily facilitates nuclear arms racing;** it poisons relations between the nuclear nations, destroys strategic stability and makes deep nuclear reductions difficult to realize.”

### Mod – Surveillance Key

#### Surveillance assets enable preemptive strike on Chinese command and control – huge deterrent fears

Kulacki, China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program, 2014

(www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/china-missile-defense.pdf)

This lack of Chinese concern about the impact of U.S. missile defense on the use of its conventional missiles might reflect Chinese technical assessments of the performance of the defenses, the capabilities of Chinese missiles or the effectiveness of Chinese countermeasures. It could also reflect a belief that the sheer numbers of Chinese missiles could overwhelm any imaginable missile defense system. Whatever the reason, Chinese analysts do not seemed overly concerned that attempts to use conventional missiles in conflict scenarios involving the United States will be rendered ineffective by missile defenses.

There is, however, a very pronounced concern about being able to protect China’s conventional missile forces from a possible preemptive strike, either against the missiles themselves or against their command and control systems. The radars the United States is deploying in the region, including those that support missile defense, are a significant concern for Chinese military planners, as are the satellites the United States can use to identify, track and strike potential Chinese targets. Wu Riqiang, a technically trained Chinese security analyst from People’s University, argues the U.S. radars in the region associated with its missile defense program, when used to observe Chinese missile testing programs, could provide U.S. observers with useful information on the capabilities of Chinese missiles and missile defense countermeasures (Wu 2013). When discussing U.S. reports of a Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile, Wu hypothesized that China might be reluctant to test the missile because of the possibility of unnecessarily exposing information about the missile.

### Mod – Impact 2AC

#### Increasing escalation would lead to massive conflict

Hugh White, 5-5-2015, "Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808>; Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book “The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power” was published in the US by Oxford University Press.; A.A.

So back then a US-China conflict carried much bigger economic and military risks for China than for America. That made the TRA's commitments both highly credible and very unlikely to be tested. Washington could safely assume that Beijing would back off to avoid a conflict in which China had so much more to lose than America. Things are different today. **China's economy is** now **so big and** so **central to global trade and capital flows that the consequences of any disruption would be just as serious for America as for China**. Militarily, America can no longer expect a swift and certain victory in a war over Taiwan. China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities would preclude direct US intervention unless those capabilities had first been degraded by a sustained and wide-ranging strike campaign against Chinese bases and forces. China would very likely respond to such a campaign with attacks on US and allied bases throughout Asia. The US has no evident means to cap the resulting escalation spiral, and no one could be sure it would stop below the nuclear threshold. **The possibility of nuclear attacks on US cities would have to be considered.** These new realities of power mean that today a US-China conflict would impose equal risks and costs on both sides. And where costs and risks are equal, the advantage lies with those who have more at stake, and hence greater resolve. China's leaders today seem to think they hold this advantage, and they are probably right. It is therefore a big mistake to keep assuming, as many people seem to do, that China would be sure to back off before a crisis over Taiwan became a conflict.

### Mod – Coop Key

#### US-China necessary to solve for nuclear expansion

Elbridge Colby and Wu Riqiang, 4-18-2016, "How the US and China Can Talk Each Other Out of a Nuclear Arms Race," Defense One, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/both-sides-now-how-us-and-china-can-talk-each-other-out-nuclear-arms-race/127569/>; Elbridge A. Colby is the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS); Wu Riqiang is an Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Renmin University in China.; A.A.

Nuclear weapons are likely to loom larger in Sino-U.S.relations in light of China’s rise, the growing tensions in the Asia-Pacific, and the potential for irritants in the relationship to result in conflict. **It is vital that the two sides cooperate intelligently to promote strategic stability**, both **to prevent an arms race and to keep accidents and misperceptions from becoming conflicts or driving further escalation.**

### \*\*AT Glaser Indicts

### AT Kim

#### Kim mischaracterizes Chinese intentions – they’ll say yes, no ill effects

Glaser 16 ((Charles L. Glaser (Charles L. Glaser is professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies. His research focuses on international relations theory and international security policy. Professor Glaser's book, [Rational Theory of International Politics](https://elliott.gwu.edu/2010-books#glaser) was published by Princeton University Press in 2010. His research on international relations theory has focused on the security dilemma, defensive realism, the offense-defense balance, and arms races, including most recently "When Are Arms Races Dangerous?" in International Security (2004). His recent publications on U.S. nuclear weapons policy include "Counterforce Revisited" (with Steve Fetter), International Security (2005), and "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy" (with Fetter) International Security (2001). Professor Glaser's work on American Cold War nuclear weapons policy culminated in his book, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton 1990). Professor Glaser holds a Ph.D. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He received a BS in Physics from MIT, and an MA in Physics and an MPP from Harvard. Before joining the George Washington University, Professor Glaser was the Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Deputy Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He has also taught political science at the University of Michigan; was a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford; served on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon; was a peace fellow at the United States Institute of Peace; and was a research associate at the Center of International Studies at MIT.), “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security: Volume 40, No 4, spring 2016, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/617465 //mw)

Kim’s main argument is that China would not accept the kind of grand bargain proposed in my article. She explores a parallel historical period during which President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were negotiating the U.S. opening to China. At the time, Chinese leaders held that “they did not owe the United States anything in exchange for a withdrawal of U.S. forces” from Taiwan, and they demonstrated no interest in a deal that have would involved ending China’s support for North Vietnam in return for U.S. concessions. Kim argues that if a weaker China was unwilling to negotiate over a less important issue, a “much more confident and ambitious” China is virtually certain to be unwilling to make the kind of maritime and territorial disputes concessions that I propose. The probability that China would accept the grand bargain might be low, but neither the history that Kim reviews nor current Chinese thinking make this a certainty. As I [End Page 188] note in my article, there are reasons for doubting that China would make the required concessions: China’s positions on its long-standing disputes in the South China and East China Seas appear to have hardened over the past decade. Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism continues to grow, and President Xi Jinping appears committed to increasing China’s global prestige, which could rule out geopolitical compromises. Nevertheless, the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the United States as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and, closely related, a large reduction in the security threat posed by the United States. The grand bargain, therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility. An obvious rejoinder is that merely proposing a grand bargain would be risky for the United States and, therefore, its low probability of success makes it a bad policy option. The risks concern the potential damage to the United States’ credibility for protecting its interests. As I argue in the article, however, the United States could adopt a variety of policies that would largely preserve its credibility—among them, continuing to reinforce its alliance with Japan and to cooperate with other security partners in the region. Such options would be available to the United States while it pursued the grand bargain and even afterward, if the bargain was not attained.

### AT Easley

#### Easley’s indict is marred with logical fallacies and historical inaccuracies

Glaser 16 ((Charles L. Glaser (Charles L. Glaser is professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies. His research focuses on international relations theory and international security policy. Professor Glaser's book, [Rational Theory of International Politics](https://elliott.gwu.edu/2010-books#glaser) was published by Princeton University Press in 2010. His research on international relations theory has focused on the security dilemma, defensive realism, the offense-defense balance, and arms races, including most recently "When Are Arms Races Dangerous?" in International Security (2004). His recent publications on U.S. nuclear weapons policy include "Counterforce Revisited" (with Steve Fetter), International Security (2005), and "National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy" (with Fetter) International Security (2001). Professor Glaser's work on American Cold War nuclear weapons policy culminated in his book, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton 1990). Professor Glaser holds a Ph.D. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He received a BS in Physics from MIT, and an MA in Physics and an MPP from Harvard. Before joining the George Washington University, Professor Glaser was the Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Deputy Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He has also taught political science at the University of Michigan; was a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford; served on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon; was a peace fellow at the United States Institute of Peace; and was a research associate at the Center of International Studies at MIT.), “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security: Volume 40, No 4, spring 2016, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/617465 //mw)

Easley also contends that the grand bargain is infeasible, but he focuses on the constraints imposed by U.S. domestic politics. “Choosing not to look inside the ‘black box’ of foreign policy interests,” Easley argues, “Glaser discounts the bipartisan consensus, upheld over five administrations, to support Taiwan to an extent that maintains regional stability.” This criticism is less potent than Kim’s. The goal of my article was to assess the desirability of the options available to the United States vis-à-vis its policy toward China. To lay the foundation for my analysis, I spelled out my assessment of U.S. interests. Analysts who disagree, because they believe that U.S. interests in protecting Taiwan are larger or different, may well reach divergent conclusions. The key problem with Easley’s letter, however, is that Easley does not appreciate the analytic value of separating desirability from domestic political feasibility. As I wrote in the article, “Analytically, the desirability and political feasibility of U.S. security policy can often be productively separated . . . changing understandings of which policies are desirable can generate changes in the political debate in the United States that influence which policies are politically feasible” (p. 55) In other words, even though assessment of the domestic political feasibility of a policy is a necessary component of a comprehensive policy analysis, assessments that focus on desirability can provide critical insights. Easley holds that I present a biased theoretical case for accommodation, but each of his theoretical criticisms is flawed. He begins by criticizing my use of defensive realism, stating that I do “not assess competing structural and offensive realist explanations.” Thus [End Page 189] “it is unclear why a defensive realist approach should be assumed rather than tested.” Here Easley accepts a common misunderstanding—the divergence between defensive realism and it structural realist cousins reflects disagreements over what follows logically from their similar assumptions; consequently, disagreements cannot be resolved— tested—by examining states’ historical behavior. I have explored the strength of defensive realism and a more general rational variant at length in my book Rational Theory of International Politics, including comparing the theory to its key alternatives.2 Easley next holds that by not discussing the insights offered by both formal models and history, I have not adequately characterized the literature on accommodation. However, the paper by Robert Powell that Easley cites finds that although vulnerable to salami tactics, appeasement is “an equilibrium solution to the strategic problem facing the declining state” across a variety of simple models.3 Easley also argues that I should have explored the failure of appeasement in dealing with Hitler’s Germany. This case has little to offer, however—a key reason that British policy failed was that Hitler’s aims were essentially unlimited. If the United States knew that China had unlimited aims, then the case against accommodation would be much stronger. Instead of certainty, however, the United States faces uncertainty about the extent of China’s aims, which leaves open the possibility that accommodation should be a component of U.S. policy. Moreover, as I argue in my article, the United States should pursue a variety of policies to hedge against the possibility that China has unlimited aims in East Asia and is determined to push the United States out of the region. Among these policies are strengthening the United States’ key alliances and maintaining its essential military capabilities. Finally, Easley’s letter is bedeviled by inconsistencies and unsupported claims. To capture the nature of this problem, I mention just a few key examples here; a careful reading will identify many more. First, Easley claims that my concern about the military and political dangers of the military competition fueled by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is misplaced because “China is currently the only one racing.” Although it is true that the United States and China are not engaged in a full-blown arms race and that China’s increased military investment exceeds the United States’, it is also true that the United States is reacting to increased Chinese capabilities by shifting military forces to the region, modernizing those forces, and developing a military concept to defeat Chinese capabilities.4 Second, Easley argues that I discount “the negative effects of abandoning Taiwan on U.S. military capabilities,” but this is an inaccurate characterization of my analysis. My article spends a few pages exploring this issue and offers a measured assessment (pp. 74–77); Easley does not analyze the issue, nor does he provide citations to works that do. Third, Easley claims that Taiwan is “[f]ar from being the dangerous source of entrapment that Glaser describes,” but he also states that “[i]f decisionmakers in Taipei seriously feared subjugation to Beijing, they might look to defend their democracy with legal measures to strengthen Taiwan’s de facto independence. . . . Accommodating [End Page 190] assertive Chinese nationalism could hasten such outcomes.” These two claims are inconsistent, and Easley offers no way to square them.

### AT Diplomacy CP

#### Diplomatic maneuvering fails – only the plan’s offer is sufficient

Ted Carpenter 13, senior fellow for foreign policy at CATO, Tightrope Diplomacy: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan, October 31, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/tightrope-diplomacy-us-arms-sales-taiwan>

**Washington is trying to execute a**n increasingly delicate **diplomatic tightrope act**. **U.S. officials hope that Taiwan is able to maintain** its de facto **independence** rather than being absorbed by the People’s Republic. **At the same time, Washington has a stake in not** unduly **irritating Beijing**, especially given the growing importance of the bilateral economic relationship. China is also seen as a crucial player regarding several key U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues.

U.S. leaders also have the delicate task of satisfying Taipei. The resurgence of the Kuomintang Party with the election of Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2008 (and his re-election in 2012) was greeted with sighs of relief in Washington. U.S. policy makers were weary of being blindsided by Ma’s predecessor, Chen Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, who was fond of engaging in provocative gestures toward Beijing. But Ma’s more pragmatic, conciliatory position regarding the mainland remains controversial among voters. Significant U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been important to Ma’s domestic political credibility.

**Consequently**, the **Obama** administration **has attempted** to adopt **a “**Goldilocks**” approach to arms sales**—neither too much, which would infuriate Beijing, nor too little, which might undermine Ma and the KMT as well as make Taiwanese believe that reunification with the mainland cannot be avoided. The $12 billion weapons sale in late 2011 reflected that Goldilocks strategy. Ma’s government wished to purchase advanced C and D models of the F-16 fighter, but China was vehemently opposed to the sale of any F-16s, let alone the most modern ones. So Obama administration officials tried to split the difference. Washington agreed to upgrade Taiwan’s existing, less-capable A and B models, but declined to sell the more advanced versions—which would have expanded both the size and capability of Taiwan’s air force. Beijing protested that transaction (as it does with all arms sales to Taiwan) but the expressions of anger were relatively restrained.

Recent developments suggest that **maintaining such a balanced approach is becoming exceedingly difficult for Washington**. Congressional pressure (especially from the Republican-controlled House of Representatives) is mounting on the Obama administration to sell Taiwan more advanced weaponry. House members inserted an amendment in the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act urging President Obama to sell Taipei the F-16 C and D models. Reports circulated in Taiwan that a senior Republican, Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma, assured Taiwanese officials during a visit to the island earlier this year that the United States would approve the sale of Apache attack helicopters in 2014 and Patriot missiles in 2015.

While that report agitated China and gratified pro-defense circles in Taiwan, other reports upset the Taiwanese. One was that the Obama administration now insists that Taipei must get Washington’s permission even to request specific weapons systems in arms purchase proposals. Although Ma’s government denied that report, DPP supporters are convinced that it is yet more evidence that Ma is “soft” on maintaining a strong defense. Uneasiness in Taiwan increased when another report surfaced in August that Washington had reacted favorably when Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan proposed setting up a bilateral working group to discuss future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Adding to the mix is a passage in the official statement of national defense policy that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense released in early October. That passage stated that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army would have “the comprehensive military capability to deter any foreign aid that comes to Taiwan’s defense by 2020.” In other words, **Beijing** would be able to deter or repel a U.S. military intervention in response to an armed conflict between Taiwan and the mainland. The accuracy of that prediction is open to question, but it **is placing additional pressure on** the **Obama** administration both **to implement** more seriously **the so-called** U.S. strategic **pivot** to East Asia, **and to beef-up arms sales** to Taiwan so that the island can better deter any Chinese military bullying.

All of these **developments suggest that** the issue **of weapons sales to Taiwan** is coming to a head. If Washington decides to sell Apache helicopters and Patriot missiles to Taipei, as Senator Inhofe reportedly stated, **Beijing’s reaction will be** anything but mild. The Chinese regard those systems with only a little less hostility than they do the possible sale of advanced F-16’s. However, congressional pressure continues to mount on the Obama administration to intensify its military support for Taiwan—both by a more extensive transfer of arms to Taipei and by re-emphasizing the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, backed up by larger air and naval deployments in the western Pacific. **Balancing on the diplomatic tightrope may be reaching the point of** impossibility.

### AT Nuke Dialogues CP

#### Plan must come first---China views transparency and dialogue as an attempt to gain strategic superiority

Saalman, 13

(Prof-Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2/5, “Placing a Renminbi Sign on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Reductions”, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/05/placing-renminbi-sign-on-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-reductions/fo9k)

While U.S.-China strategic stability came to the fore in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in 2010, bilateral strategic stability talks at the Track-II level have existed for years. Nonetheless, the concept’s application vis-à-vis China in an official U.S. docu- 345 ment has made it the term of choice in pursuing expanded and enhanced U.S.-China strategic dialogues since 2010.7 Strategic stability is generally understood to be divided into two forms: crisis stability and arms race stability.8 These concepts were extensively analyzed in the U.S.-Soviet context and many believe they contributed to stabilizing the arms race between Washington and Moscow. In the U.S.-China strategic context, however, this heavily baggage-laden Cold War term and its conceptual implications **have the potential to exacerbate some of the very issues the concept is supposed to help redress**. In an attempt to foster greater transparency and mutual trust, U.S. and other analysts have consistently pressed China to become more transparent in the nuclear realm. Yet, a long-standing mantra in China maintains that it is already transparent enough when it comes to nuclear posture and intent. Analysts assert that, were China to be more open about nuclear force structure and components, its ability to maintain a posture of limited, much less minimum, credible deterrence would be damaged.9 This is not merely a claim to frustrate U.S. interlocutors, but a reality. Overabundance of details about an arsenal predicated on a restrained nuclear posture and size enhances the ability to decapitate it, in largest part because it can help the stronger nation to narrow the scope of the targeting problem. Nuclear transparency is thus seen as leaving China more vulnerable, and is often seen as **tantamount to the United States seeking primacy, whether nuclear or otherwise.** Ultimately, the concept of transparency in China is predicated upon the idea that such openness is possible for the powerful, not the weak. 346 China’s reticence to engage also stems from how the term “transparency” (toumingdu) has long been applied in the U.S.-China context. For decades, U.S. experts have applied the word as a means to pry greater engagement out of China on myriad subjects, leaving it overused, vague, and ultimately pejorative. Simply using the word “transparency,” without specifics or targeted proposals for increased engagement will not lead to greater interaction. In fact, the term has become so negatively charged within China, that it is best not used at all. Another issue is that the term “strategic stability” is ambiguous, providing ample room for unofficial interpretations to gain currency. The 2010 U.S. NPR applied this term repeatedly to characterize U.S. relations with both China and Russia, but ultimately did not define what it means in the U.S.-China context. Instead, Chinese experts fill in the blanks—and not necessarily in positive ways. When both Chinese and U.S. official circles maintain such a lack of clarity, whether in terms of posture or rhetoric, unofficial evaluations and conclusions are more likely to gain a wider audience than they might otherwise achieve.10 While this may be the price that both sides pay for strategic ambiguity, filtration of these analyses into official policy remains an everpresent possibility. Strategic stability’s ambiguity in U.S. pronouncements is also seen by many in China as part and parcel of U.S. efforts to maintain and augment its strategic advantage. In fact, Chinese experts who play a role in shaping China’s political and military policies have already begun to assert that China must compensate for the primacy afforded the United States by such systems as ballistic missile defense (BMD) and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS).11 347 Whether via countermeasures, possessing the same systems, altering nuclear posture, or even increasing nuclear weapons numbers, Chinese strategic and technical experts are debating how best to respond to shifts in U.S. military planning that in their view appear aimed at them.12 Nuclear programs are just one part of a larger military restructuring on the part of the United States, much of which seem to be targeting China.13 This has been amplified in the wake of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) January 2012 report delineating a shift in defense priorities, or “pivot,” toward Asia and the Pacific.14 When combined with the U.S. transition from a focus on a quantity-based to a capabilities-based nuclear posture shored up by advanced conventional capabilities, China increasingly sees itself as the longterm U.S. target. **In this light, calls for strategic stability talks are read within China as just another tactic in U.S. attempts to maintain the upper hand by forcing China into greater transparency**.15 Faced with U.S. defense adjustments seen as directed at China, **the greater transparency requested by the United States could actually exacerbate tensions rather than allay them** if they seem to be part of an overall effort to augment American superiority.

# Neg

## Escalation CP

### 1NC Escalation CP

#### The United States should:

#### - adjust official nuclear policy to acknowledge that China has a survivable second-strike capability;

#### -propose a series of high-level dialogues with the Peoples’ Republic of China on nuclear forces, planning, and doctrine;

#### -offer to initiate cooperative mechanisms with China, including reciprocal visits to missile defense sites, reciprocal notification of missile defense test launches, stationing observers at missile defense demonstrations and tests, mutual visits to nuclear reactors, mutual technical exhibitions of strategic weapons, and a series of practice inspections modeled after the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty

#### CP solves strategic stability without abandoning Taiwan

Elbridge Colby and Wu Riqiang, 4-18-2016, "How the US and China Can Talk Each Other Out of a Nuclear Arms Race," Defense One, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/both-sides-now-how-us-and-china-can-talk-each-other-out-nuclear-arms-race/127569/>; Elbridge A. Colby is the Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS); Wu Riqiang is an Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Renmin University in China.; A.A.

Proceeding from this logic, the two sides should agree to the following principles:

Mutual restraint is important to maintaining strategic stability. Both sides should seek areas where their restraint can contribute to stability in the relationship.

**The United States is not orienting or designing its national ballistic missile defenses against China.** Rather, they are motivated with respect to the Asia-Pacific by North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs.

Nonetheless, **missile defense programs designed against intercontinental-range systems have the potential to undermine the viability of the other side’s second-strike capability**. Measures designed to validate that such BMDsystems do not threaten to negate the other party’s second-strike capability are therefore to be encouraged.

**The deployment of theater-range missile defense systems is understandable and** need not undermine strategic stability. Because components of such systems can potentially threaten strategic-range missiles, or may be perceived to do so, each side should strive to differentiate its theater-range defense systems from its national defense systems. Steps that can validate to the other party that TMD systems do not have capabilities against long-range systems should be encouraged.

Efforts to differentiate both sides’ nuclear (especially strategic nuclear) forces, bases, networks, and other assets from their conventional analogs should be encouraged.

Because North Korea’s advancing missile and nuclear programs are driving U.S. national missile defense developments with respect to the Asia-Pacific, satisfactorily addressing these programs is crucial for stability in East Asia. North Korea’s nuclear program, in particular, is a grave challenge for regional stability, and a worsening one.

A conventional conflict between China and the United States would involve serious risks of escalation, and a major conventional conflict would involve grave risks of escalating to the nuclear level. Both sides should therefore focus on ensuring that their military plans, capabilities, doctrines, and postures seek to avoid encouraging nuclear escalation on the part of the other. Accordingly, both sides would benefit from a clearer understanding of the other’s nuclear doctrine, red lines, and conceptions of escalation, thereby lessening the risk of conflict arising or one that has already broken out escalating due to a preventable misunderstanding. Engagements that illuminate each side’s perspectives on these issues should therefore be encouraged. As well, crisis management cooperation should be encouraged to enable both countries to stem or stop inadvertent or accidental escalation.

In addition, **potential concrete measures that would** promote strategic stability **include reciprocal steps such as visits to national missile defense sites, observations of BMD tests, notifications of BMD and hypersonic weapon test launches, and visits to military reactors, enrichment, and reprocessing facilities; Chinese participation in New START practice inspections; official discussions on submarine security issues and verification techniques; and joint studies on key issues**, to name a few.

Such steps will not solve deeper political disagreement, but they could promote stabilizing postures and reduce the chances of misperception which could result in more severe tensions, or even worse.

### 2NC Solves Miscalc/War

#### CP key to information sharing and transparency – prevents miscalc

Colby, principal analyst and division lead for global strategic affairs @ Center for Naval Analyses, and Denmark, VP for political and security affairs – National Bureau of Asian Research, ‘13

(Elbridge A. and Abraham M., “Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward,” A Report of the PONI Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics, CSIS)

The United States should therefore continue its efforts to urge China to engage in a more sustained in-depth dialogue on strategic issues. Such a dialogue should include eliciting greater insight into how China thinks about the role and potential use of its nuclear weapons, its red lines and perception of its vital interests, its conception of escalation, and related topics. Meanwhile, Beijing could gain a firmer understanding of U.S. views on these subjects (although the United States is relatively transparent on such matters). More to the point, responsible U.S. officials would have an opportunity to explain directly to their Chinese counterparts U.S. official thinking on these matters. Through such dialogue, both sides would gain a better understanding of each other’s perspectives on these fraught questions. Because the most likely and therefore dangerous pathway toward conflict between the United States and China is probably through miscalculation or misunderstanding of the other’s red lines, such dialogue would be highly constructive in minimizing the chances of such a disastrous outcome.

Such dialogue should also focus on exploring mechanisms for exchanging information. Information exchanges useful for confidence building can be structured through formal mechanisms such as the strategic arms reduction treaties between the United States and Russia, but they do not have to be. Rather, information can be productively exchanged through less formal dialogues. For example, the U.S. side has delivered briefings on why U.S. ballistic missile defenses are not a genuine threat to China’s strategic deterrent. The United States could continue to provide briefings on this topic, as well as on the implications of its ongoing efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal and develop CPGS programs. Meanwhile, China could provide a fuller explanation of its nuclear strategy and its approach to escalation and could deliver briefings on some of its systems that pose concerns to the United States, such as its antisatellite (ASAT) weapon capabilities.

### 2NC Solves Modernization

#### Transparency solves arms racing

Colby, principal analyst and division lead for global strategic affairs @ Center for Naval Analyses, and Denmark, VP for political and security affairs – National Bureau of Asian Research, ‘13

(Elbridge A. and Abraham M., “Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations: A Way Forward,” A Report of the PONI Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics, CSIS)

Based on this concept, stability can emerge between the United States and China if they each field forces that are capable of surviving a first strike and if they are able to credibly demonstrate to the other side that their current and future capabilities are unable to deny the other side a viable strategic deterrent. As a result, fear of preemption and the need to launch weapons early become irrelevant, either as irritants in crisis or as dangers in conflict. In this way, the benefits of deterrence can be retained while minimizing the chances of nuclear escalation.

The premise of arms control and stability-oriented measures is that even potential adversaries can achieve the twin goals of both effective nuclear deterrence and mitigation of the possibility of conflict between them.16 This is because nuclear forces themselves can intensify, if not cause, competition and even conflict—but they need not. Nuclear deterrence is not simply a unilateral action that takes places in a vacuum; rather, it is a relationship shaped by perceptions. Indeed, the ways in which a country procures, postures, and operates its nuclear forces have a major interactive effect on how other countries procure, posture, and operate their forces. Potential adversaries can allay, and possibly even remove, these exacerbating factors through unilateral and cooperative measures that effectively demonstrate that each side’s strategic forces are not capable of conducting a disarming first strike. Such measures do not solve more fundamental political and strategic disputes, but they can help to lessen tensions and mistrust stemming from the essentially ancillary technical features of interstate relations.

Both sides could derive value from cooperation on nuclear weapons grounded in the stability concept. The United States worries about the composition of China’s nuclear force, Chinese views on escalation and plans for nuclear use, and the future trajectory of China’s strategic posture. Meanwhile, China worries that the United States may be able or seek to be able to deny it a secondstrike capability, and it worries about the scope and sophistication of future U.S. programs, as well as U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge a condition of mutual vulnerability between the two nations. A stability-grounded model could help address these anxieties—on the U.S. side by providing greater insight into China’s current and future force structure and deeper insight into China’s ways of thinking about nuclear strategy, and on the Chinese side by providing similar insight into U.S. developments and a greater degree of assurance about U.S. acknowledgment of the survivability of China’s force. Concurrently, such an approach would have the added benefit of building confidence on both sides. Finally, such a model could provide a satisfactory method through which China could see something approximating its current force size, posture, and doctrine as satisfactory and compatible with stability.

## Case

### Glaser Indicts/No Solvency

\*\*specific to the aff evidence

#### Glaser misapplies IR theory and defies empirics

Easley 16 (Leif-Eric Easley, Leif-Eric Easley is the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at Shorenstein APARC. Dr. Easley completed his Ph.D. at the Harvard University Department of Government in 2010, specializing in East Asian international relations. He was a long-time affiliate of the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR) and was Japan area editor for the Harvard Asia Quarterly. He served as a teaching fellow at Harvard in the subjects of Asian international relations and American foreign policy and was advisor for a senior thesis on historical memory and foreign policy in Asia. He was also a visiting scholar at Yonsei University and the University of Southern California's Korean Studies Institute. Easley regularly speaks at international conferences and is actively involved in high-level U.S.-Asia exchanges (Track II diplomacy) as a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research appears in a variety of academic journals, supplemented by commentaries in major newspapers.), “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security: Volume 40, No 4, spring 2016, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/617465 //mw)

In “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” Charles Glaser identifies a mismatch between Chinese security goals and the status quo in Asia.1 Concerned that the probability of war will increase with divergence between the distribution of power and benefits under the existing regional order, Glaser proposes accommodating China in areas “that do not compromise vital U.S. interests” (p. 50). He recommends a “grand bargain” wherein the United States abandons Taiwan in exchange for China’s peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas and acceptance of an enduring U.S. military presence in East Asia. Glaser’s motivation—to avoid U.S.-China conflict—is laudable, and his article is a detailed assault on policy orthodoxy. Yet, it is essentially a policy recommendation framed as a desirability study, which ultimately does not demonstrate desirability or feasibility. Below I present three sets of objections regarding the article’s one-sided account of the accommodation literature, its incomplete cost-benefit assessment of abandoning Taiwan, and its selective exclusion of norms and values integral to U.S. strategy in Asia. appeasement not preferred in theory or practice Glaser contrasts his defensive realist approach with structural realism and offensive realism, which he says predict that U.S.-China relations will resemble those between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, with nuclear weapons keeping the peace but with insecurity increasing as China attempts to claim regional hegemony. He does not assess competing structural and offensive realist explanations, however.2 And without convincing evidence that Chinese aims are limited and nationalism [End Page 178] is under control, it is unclear why a defensive realist approach should be assumed rather than tested. Glaser argues that an established power can enhance its security by pursuing territorial accommodation toward a rising power. He cites international relations theorists who lament that concessions-granting strategies suffer a stigma in foreign policy circles.3 The literature suggests, however**, that appeasement usually fails,** and **even in the handful of historical circumstances in which it may have succeeded, its benefits tended** not to last.4 Efforts to model strategies of accommodation suggest that a declining power may instead have incentives to hold the line early against a rising challenger to preempt its use of salami tactics and avoid engaging in a future conflict under less favorable conditions.**5 Glaser offers almost no coverage of the most studied case of failed territorial accommodation vis-à-vis Germany**, **nor does he provide historical examples where accommodation succeeded.** A**pplications of bargaining theory are generally unsupportive of appeasement,** stressing incentives that governments have to misrepresent their intentions.6 An accommodation strategy might make sense for a weak power with reliable intelligence that its adversary has limited aims or for a relatively matched power that seeks to buy time for rearmament.7 These conditions do not apply to the U.S.-China case, however. The United States lacks reliable intelligence on China’s limited aims, but it is not a weak power and it has no need to abandon Taiwan for the sake of improving its military capabilities. Glaser suggests that the United States seek accommodation before Beijing amasses greater power, but China’s economic growth is slowing; corruption and skills gaps plague its military; and the Communist Party faces crises of social stability, governance and legitimacy over economic inequality, land use, public safety, and environmental pollution. **The theoretical need to accommodate China is thus** not established.

#### Glaser neglects regional conflicts and current events – grand bargain will worsen conflict

Easley 16 (Leif-Eric Easley, Leif-Eric Easley is the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at Shorenstein APARC. Dr. Easley completed his Ph.D. at the Harvard University Department of Government in 2010, specializing in East Asian international relations. He was a long-time affiliate of the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR) and was Japan area editor for the Harvard Asia Quarterly. He served as a teaching fellow at Harvard in the subjects of Asian international relations and American foreign policy and was advisor for a senior thesis on historical memory and foreign policy in Asia. He was also a visiting scholar at Yonsei University and the University of Southern California's Korean Studies Institute. Easley regularly speaks at international conferences and is actively involved in high-level U.S.-Asia exchanges (Track II diplomacy) as a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research appears in a variety of academic journals, supplemented by commentaries in major newspapers.), “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security: Volume 40, No 4, spring 2016, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/617465 //mw)

Glaser nonetheless sees benefits in accommodating China on Taiwan. He opines that current Taiwan policy could precipitate a U.S.-China cold war, even though the United States has much greater economic interdependence with China than it did with the Soviet Union and even though China is more globalized today than the Soviet Union ever was. He worries that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan will fuel an arms race, even [End Page 179] though China is currently the only one racing.8 Glaser identifies U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a major stumbling block for improving U.S.-China relations and winning the “hearts and minds of 1.3 billion people” (p. 71). But the sales have been defensive in nature and limited in scale.9 Although the United States’ “six assurances” to Taiwan specify that arms sales not be suspended as a result of negotiations with Beijing, such sales have been slowed by U.S. bureaucratic considerations and budgetary debates in Taipei. Glaser does not mention how Barack Obama’s administration came to office focused on strategic reassurance with China, including delaying arms sales to Taiwan and, controversially, issuing a joint statement respecting Chinese “core interests.”10 Despite these efforts at accommodation, Chinese foreign policy became more assertive rather than more cooperative. Points of friction in U.S.-China relations abound—from cyber espionage and human rights to trade disputes and financial governance. **Abandoning Taiwan** will not stop Chinese military modernization**, antiaccess/area denial development,** or the targeting of U.S. bases in Japan **and South Korea with Chinese missiles**.11 The United States has numerous reasons for conducting surveillance and freedom of navigation operations, so those activities Glaser identifies as irritants to China would not end, even if Taiwan were no longer a subject of disagreement. Foreign policy ambition in Beijing has outgrown the 1950s and 1990s cross-strait crises; Chinese internal debates tend to paint the United States as a global competitor, benchmark U.S. global capabilities, and derive legitimacy from contrasting Chinese political values with “Western” or “universal” values.12 Glaser does not mention Chinese efforts at building up alternative institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, Boao Forum for Asia, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or China using issues of historical animosity to drive a wedge between Japan and South Korea. He thus underestimates the apparent Chinese strategy of not directly confronting the United States globally, while attempting to dilute U.S. alliances in Asia, pursuing a Chinese-centered regional architecture, and changing the status quo in maritime areas without going so far as to trigger conflict or a coherent balancing coalition.13 **Rather than alleviate frictions, a grand bargain would likely motivate beliefs that China could eventually** dismantle the U.S. security architecture **in Asia,** emboldening actors on the Chinese side **to pursue their interests more assertively**. U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would entail repealing the Taiwan Relations Act, ending the legal basis for defense cooperation and arms sales**, immediately undermining deterrence**, and steadily [End Page 180] degrading Taiwan’s defense capabilities in ways difficult to reverse.14 Meanwhile, China’s salami tactics, in combination with its ability to quickly redeploy military assets it might agree to pull back and its demonstrated long-term approach to the East China and South China Seas, **make any such deal as Glaser suggests** not credible. Chinese official documents give no reason to believe that Beijing would be conciliatory on other claims if the United States accommodated China on Taiwan.15 Taipei also claims sovereignty over the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Beijing’s legal claim to these islands, which it calls the Diaoyu Islands, heavily relies on the history of the Republic of China and the status of “Taiwan Province.”16 Meanwhile, Taiwan maintains troops and recently upgraded its facilities on Taiping/Itu Aba, the largest naturally occurring feature of the disputed Spratly Islands, where China has been engaged in land reclamation and construction on features it controls. **U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would likely make Chinese decisionmakers believe they could strengthen their claims in the East China and South China Seas by coercing Taipei to consolidate its positions with those of Beijing.** Beijing’s assertive policies contrast to the responsible, measured, and cooperative approach Taipei has taken to managing disputed claims in the East China and South China Seas.17 Far from being the dangerous source of entrapment Glaser describes, Taiwan is a valuable strategic and economic partner.18 In June 2015, the United States and Taiwan signed the Global Cooperation and Training Framework agreement to jointly offer capacity building in areas such as public health, women’s empowerment, environmental protection, and maritime safety. Leaders across Taiwan’s political spectrum have internalized lessons from the provocative Chen Shui-bian years and are not about to risk the lives and treasure of their people for the sake of forcing Washington’s hand vis-à-vis Beijing. Moreover, the United States has historically managed to deter challengers and restrain partners, preventing both sides from initiating or escalating conflicts.19 [End Page 181] **The U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan is not preventing something good from happening, but rather** preventing some seriously bad things from happening.20 U.S. defense exchanges and intelligence sharing with Taipei may annoy nationalists in Beijing, but they help avoid miscalculation, support escalation control, and discourage provocation and aggression**. Glaser discounts the negative effects** of abandoning Taiwan on U.S. military capabilities and intelligence gathering in Asia, freedom of navigation, and maritime and energy security. Under his proposed bargain, the United States would be avoiding hypothetical costs and pursuing uncertain benefits while giving up known military benefits and incurring unnecessary strategic costs.

### Glaser Indicts – 2NC

#### Glaser ignores the reality of politics – aff doesn’t solve US-China war, causes Asia arms races

Easley 16 (Leif-Eric Easley, Leif-Eric Easley is the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at Shorenstein APARC. Dr. Easley completed his Ph.D. at the Harvard University Department of Government in 2010, specializing in East Asian international relations. He was a long-time affiliate of the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR) and was Japan area editor for the Harvard Asia Quarterly. He served as a teaching fellow at Harvard in the subjects of Asian international relations and American foreign policy and was advisor for a senior thesis on historical memory and foreign policy in Asia. He was also a visiting scholar at Yonsei University and the University of Southern California's Korean Studies Institute. Easley regularly speaks at international conferences and is actively involved in high-level U.S.-Asia exchanges (Track II diplomacy) as a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His research appears in a variety of academic journals, supplemented by commentaries in major newspapers.), “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China,” International Security: Volume 40, No 4, spring 2016, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/617465 //mw)

Furthermore, **Glaser’s proposed grand bargain is** politically infeasible. For accommodation over Taiwan to purchase the peaceful rise of China, Chinese aims should be limited (doubtful), integration with Taiwan should be peaceful (uncertain), and relevant actors would have to play along with the strategic bargain (extremely unlikely). Glaser explains that he is “bounding the analysis” (p. 52), but **excluding the role of actors other than the U.S. and Chinese leaderships produces** unrealistic and even counterproductive recommendations.21 Glaser’s analysis ignores the role of Taiwan—a free society of more than 23 million— and makes no mention of identity and political preferences on the island. Comparing data from 1994 and 2014 reveals that more and more citizens self-identify as Taiwanese (20.2 percent to 60.6 percent), fewer identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese (44.6 percent to 32.5 percent), and the number identifying as Chinese has plummeted (26.2 percent to 3.5 percent).22 The Ma Ying-jeou administration’s policy of economic integration—culminating in the first-ever cross-strait summit when President Ma met President Xi Jinping in Singapore in November 2015—was greeted with intense domestic skepticism. The recent “Sunflower Movement” against economic integration with China, student protests against proposed China-friendly revisions to history textbooks, and suspicion of Chinese intentions after observing the Hong Kong experience under “one country, two systems” all suggest that a U.S.-China grand bargain would be actively resisted by myriad actors on Taiwan. If decisionmakers in Taipei seriously feared subjugation to Beijing, they might look to defend their democracy with legal measures to strengthen Taiwan’s de facto independence23 or additional deterrent capabilities, [End Page 182] not limited to conventional means.24 Accommodating assertive Chinese nationalism could hasten such outcomes; better for Beijing to accommodate subnational identities, in Hong Kong and elsewhere, to demonstrate good faith and soft power to Taiwan.25 **Glaser not only sets aside Taiwan’s ability to affect outcomes; he does not consider the roles of other states in Asia**. Japanese, Indian, and Southeast Asian strategists doubt that China’s territorial goals are limited, based on their observation of China’s expanding power projection capabilities and resource needs. Glaser writes that Taiwan is the only dispute important enough to bring the United States and China into conflict, but **the divided Korean Peninsula remains an area where the two could clash in**, for example, a contingency precipitated by a North Korean attack or a race to secure nuclear weapons and fissile material during post-collapse stabilization missions. When political change comes to North Korea, China should be integral to processes of peaceful denuclearization, economic integration, and eventual unification, but Washington’s interests will be tied to close cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo. It would be extremely counterproductive if damaged U.S. credibility motivated leaders in Beijing to expect (and those in Seoul and Tokyo to fear) a U.S.-China deal to seal the fate of Korea. **Abandonment of Taiwan would be a greater shock for U.S. credibility** than the 2008 financial crisis, Arab Spring, Syrian civil war, or Ukrainian conflict because it would contradict decades of U.S. policy, be a sin of commission rather than omission, and have greater direct relevance to Asia’s geopolitics. **A grand bargain with China would not only degrade U.S. soft power and alliances; it could drive Asian countries to unilaterally enhance their own defenses, fueling an arms race and further diminishing security in the region.** Glaser suggests that such dynamics could be avoided if U.S. leaders visit Japan and South Korea with security treaties in hand and clarify why those countries are different from Taiwan. Alliances among democracies are based not only on treaties and national interests, however, but also on shared values and popular support. Perceptions of reliability affect how people vote and can redirect democratic processes behind alliance cooperation. Glaser’s decision not to consider U.S. domestic politics is also problematic. The article focuses on what Glaser thinks are U.S. national interests, rather than on what different political parties, branches of government, businesses, civil society groups, and bureaucratic stakeholders consider U.S. interests. Putting aside the moral failings of disregarding U.S.-Taiwan historical commitments, shared values, and human rights, treating Taiwan as a tradable commodity in great power bargaining is a nonstarter in U.S. politics. **Quid pro quo accommodation of China would be resisted** in Congress as [End Page 183] appeasement or overturned by a subsequent administration. Choosing not to look inside the “black box” of U.S. foreign policy interests, Glaser discounts the bipartisan consensus, upheld over five administrations, to support Taiwan to an extent that maintains regional stability.26 U.S. policy stresses that a political settlement between China and Taiwan must be decided peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people. Supporting Taiwan is thus not only about preventing conflict, but also about showing people on the mainland that Chinese democracy is possible. As more mainlanders visit Taiwan and witness its freedoms, they return home asking why they do not enjoy similar rule of law. This interaction demonstrates how Glaser’s version of U.S. grand strategy in Asia— staying in the region with strong alliances—is incomplete. The National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and other official statements include the defense of international norms.27 Such norms and values are essential for linking major components of U.S. strategy: legitimizing forward deployment, bringing together allies and regional institutions, and setting standards for China’s peaceful rise.

#### The aff tarnishes US image and damages its interests

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Although Glaser’s desire to mitigate the chances for future conflict with an increasingly powerful and ambitious China is laudable, his proposed grand bargain is a nonstarter. Glaser acknowledges that territorial accommodation could come at the cost of downgrading China’s assessment of U.S. resolve to protect its interests and allies in Asia, compromising American values, and damaging U.S. credibility in the eyes of its allies. He insists, however, that by demanding China keeps its side of the bargain and by enhancing U.S. military capabilities in the region, the United States would signal its determination to stand by American interests. Glaser’s proposal is unsound for several reasons. First, if the United States did not damage its image by attempting such a bargain in the first place, it would not need to redemonstrate resolve. Second, such a bargain would undercut one of the fundamental reasons why the United States stands with its friends and allies in East Asia—a shared appreciation of democracy and liberty. Third, Glaser emphasizes that regardless of whether the United States and China were able to strike a grand bargain, the very attempt would provide useful information about China’s foreign policy decisionmaking and long-term aims (pp. 79–82). Engaging in such a costly and risky exercise to gauge Chinese motives is imprudent to say the least, especially because motives evolve and are contingent on the behavior of other actors. Fourth, giving any state a concession for doing something it ought to do sets a dangerous precedent. China and other claimant states should solve their maritime disputes peacefully and refrain from unilateral moves.

#### Glaser’s Taiwan grand bargain fails and China says no – empirics

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Even if one were to set aside all of the above concerns, history shows that Glaser’s proposal is infeasible, because Chinese leaders do not see the abrogation of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an issue over which they must bargain and offer concessions. For example, President Richard Nixon attempted a similar grand bargain while negotiating the opening of Sino-U.S. relations from 1971 to 1972. At the time, one of the Nixon administration’s greatest concerns was ending the Vietnam War. Beijing’s greatest priority was obtaining U.S. recognition of Taiwan as a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and securing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island.2 Understanding [End Page 185] Beijing’s desires, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strategized that they would offer to remove U.S. troops in exchange for China’s help in achieving peace with honor in Vietnam. Nixon’s handwritten notes for his historic trip to China demonstrate the bargain he wanted to strike: Taiwan = Vietnam = trade off 1. Your people expect action on Taiwan 2. Our people expect action on VN Neither can act immediately—But both are inevitable—let us not embarrass each other.3 In preparation for Nixon’s official visit, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and proposed the bargain to the Chinese leadership. In a meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Kissinger stated that because two-thirds of the U.S. forces in Taiwan were related to American efforts in the Indochina theater, the withdrawal of those troops would depend on the resolution of the Vietnam War.4 He reasoned that although the United States was sincere in wanting to end the war, several issues— ranging from war reparations to the North Vietnamese government’s refusal to talk with the South Vietnamese government—stood in the way of an “honorable” exit.5 Kissinger implied that China’s help in pressuring its North Vietnamese ally to accept the administration’s peace terms would speed the exit of U.S. troops from Taiwan. Chinese leaders, however, refused to strike such a bargain. In their eyes, Taiwan was a rightful part of the PRC and they did not owe the United States anything in exchange for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from territory they considered theirs. Zhou, for example, told Kissinger during their July 1971 meeting that attempting to attach conditions to the recognition of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan was as absurd as China questioning U.S. sovereignty over Hawaii or Long Island. He emphasized that the United States should “unreservedly” recognize the PRC’s sovereignty and withdraw all U.S. troops, as this was “the natural logic of the matter.”6 Again when Nixon suggested during his trip to Beijing in February 1972 that ending the war in Vietnam would “help the direction on Taiwan,”7 Zhou replied subtly that China was willing to “wait a little while,” and that because Taiwan was China’s “internal affair,” Beijing could not “place too much hope on the U.S. and Mr. President to achieve this.”8 Moreover, China continued to fund North Vietnam’s war efforts in the name of aiding nationalist revolutions [End Page 186] abroad. Instead of pressuring its ally, Beijing sent unprecedented amounts of military assistance to North Vietnam between 1971 and 1973.9 China today is much more confidant and ambitious than the China Nixon visited in 1972. There is little reason to believe that Beijing would entertain a bargain similar to the one it rejected decades ago.

#### No aff solvency – miscommunications, wrong brand of engagement

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Whereas Glaser’s grand bargain is infeasible, the benefits associated with territorial accommodation, such as satisfying a rising power to reduce the chance of conflict and sending reassuring signals, are worthy of serious thought. To satisfy and reassure China, one must decipher what it wants. Determining exactly what Beijing desires may be difficult, if not impossible, given multiple interests within the Chinese state and the evolving nature of any state’s aims. The central government, however, has repeatedly articulated two broad goals: the “rejuvenation” of the Chinese state at home and abroad. In fact, Xi Jinping’s first remarks after his appointment as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012 were that the party’s responsibility was to work toward “the great revival of the Chinese nation,” so that China can “stand more firmly and powerfully among all nations around the world and make a greater contribution to mankind.”10 Since then Xi has promoted the idea of the “Chinese Dream,” or zhongguo meng, which essentially consists of achieving prosperity at home and expanding China’s role and prestige in the global arena.11 Importantly, these twin goals are not necessarily incompatible with U.S. interests. A domestically stable and prosperous China with a satisfied citizenry could reduce pressure on the central government to avenge China’s “century of humiliation” by outsiders. Furthermore, a wealthy and civic-minded China with an expanded international role would not necessarily threaten U.S. interests. The world could benefit from China’s contribution to disaster relief efforts and environmental issues, its leadership in combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and its generous aid to developing countries. Chinese leaders today believe that the United States is determined to contain and divide China internally.12 To reassure Beijing that this is not its intention, the United States can assist China in its rejuvenation efforts. For example, it can deepen economic interdependence through initiatives such as the U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty, which is currently being negotiated; share information and ideas on issues such as health care and social safety net programs; and support China’s desire for a greater role in the global arena by welcoming Chinese initiatives such as the recently established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In addition, China could be given a greater role in existing institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.13 [End Page 187] Giving China a bigger voice at the table will inevitably lead to disagreements, but it is better to debate and compromise with China at the same table than to have it create separate venues in which the United States has no influence. To conclude, a **one-time territorial accommodation is not the answer to dealing with an increasingly powerful and ambitious China**. Acknowledging China’s fundamental goals and shaping its behavior through engagement are better approaches to dealing with a power that is here to stay. Moreover, the United States’ Asian partners would welcome such a move instead of unnecessary confrontation or compromise.

#### Aff fails – Glaser gets his facts wrong

Roy 15 (Denny Roy (Senior Fellow and Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program, Ph.D., Political Science, University of Chicago, B efore joining the East-West Center in 2007, Roy worked at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu for seven years, rising to the rank of Professor after starting as a Research Fellow. In 1998--2000 Roy was a faculty member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. There he taught courses on China, Asian history, and Southeast Asian politics. Roy was a Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, where he studied and wrote on Northeast Asian security issues. Roy was attached to the Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute as coordinator for Singaporean students enrolled in the SDSC's M.A. program. From 1990 to 1995, Roy held faculty appointments in the Political Science Departments of the National University of Singapore (Lecturer) and Brigham Young University (Assistant Professor), teaching courses on international relations and Asian politics. Roy has five years of work and residency experience in Taiwan, Korea and Singapore. He has made presentations at academic conferences in China, Thailand, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Australia and the USA., “The Impossible Price of a US-China Grand Bargain: Dumping Taiwan,” The National Interest, 24 June 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-impossible-price-us-china-grand-bargain-dumping-taiwan-13177?page=2 //mw)

The argument that Washington should abandon support for Taiwan to gain favor with Beijing faces strong counter-arguments that have prevailed in policy-making up to now. George Washington University professor [Charles L. Glaser presents a fresh reboot of the idea in the spring 2015 issue of the journal International Security](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/toc/isec/39/4). Glaser says protecting Asia-Pacific allies is a vital U.S. interest, but protecting Taiwan is not. Yet Taiwan is the main cause of Chinese opposition to U.S. strategic leadership in the region. Meanwhile, tensions between China and rival claimants over disputed territory in the East and South China Seas threatens to spark military conflict, and foreign governments wish for more clarity in Beijing’s longer-term strategic intentions – specifically, whether it is a “greedy state” that seeks to replace the United States as regional hegemon. Glaser proposes solving all of these problems through a Sino-U.S. “grand bargain”: the United States government “ends its commitment to defend Taiwan” in exchange for Beijing’s promise to “peacefully resolve” its maritime territorial disputes and “officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.” The case for abandoning Taiwan typically meets at least three large barriers: the betrayal of U.S. ideals, harm to America’s reputation as a reliable security partner, and Taiwan’s strategic value. Glaser’s argumentation does not overcome these barriers. Glaser says he recognizes that a foreign friendly country’s hard-won civil liberties “are important values” that Washington “should be reluctant to jeopardize,” but in the end they are not “key national interests” for the United States and are therefore expendable. It is debatable that the preservation of a democratic Taiwan is not a key U.S. interest. Recent U.S. presidential administrations representing both major political parties have affirmed a U.S. strategic interest in spreading democracy because democratic countries are generally supportive of the U.S.-sponsored international system of liberal norms and institutions. Glaser focuses on the US interest in [avoiding a war with China](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/5-ways-the-us-china-could-stumble-war-12250). But what about the U.S. interest in preventing [a Taiwan-China war](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-really-go-war-china-save-taiwan-12949)? One of the main reasons for U.S. forward deployment is to help keep the region stable. The PRC argues that the Taiwan “separatist” challenge would quickly dry up if the U.S. stopped selling weapons to Taiwan, but Taipei has argued the opposite: cross-Strait stability is possible only if Taiwan feels secure, and the Republic of China (ROC) will not negotiate with China under the gun. Beijing should not assume Taiwan would be quick to surrender even in a disadvantageous situation. Abandoning staunch, long-time friend like Taiwan would damage U.S. credibility in the eyes of other regional governments. Glaser argues that in the case of Japan, this damage would be containable. Tokyo realizes that compared to Taipei, its relationship with Washington is more strongly institutionalized. Japan also has nowhere else to go, he says, other than sticking with the United States. This is probably true, although U.S. abandonment of Taiwan would reinforce Japan’s fear regarding the long-term U.S. reliability to stand up to a strengthening China. This would embolden Japanese advocates of accommodating China, as well as those who call for a militarily strong Japan unleashed from the alliance. What about the damage to the reputation of the U.S. among friends in Seoul, Canberra, Manila, and elsewhere? Glaser mentions only Tokyo, the relatively easy case. (Recommended: [Would America Risk a Nuclear War with China over Taiwan?](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/would-america-risk-nuclear-war-china-over-taiwan-12808)) On the subject of Taiwan’s strategic value, Glaser spends most of his effort arguing against his own thesis. He points out that Taiwan acts as a huge barrier, creating choke points for the deployment of PLA naval forces, while possession of Taiwan would give the PLAN direct access to the deeper waters of the Pacific, would increase [the Chinese A2/AD capability](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/countering-china%E2%80%99s-a2-ad-challenge-9099), would extend the range of air cover for the Chinese navy, and particularly would make it easy for Chinese submarines to enter the Philippine Sea and threaten US carrier battle groups there. Having made these points, Glaser unconvincingly concludes that controlling Taiwan would not “significantly increase” Chinese military leverage. Glaser’s case has other weaknesses. He assumes that the US abandonment of Taiwan would “dramatically improve” U.S.-China relations, and that “China can be very secure with the United States maintaining its alliances and forward deployment” as long as Taiwan is no longer in play. This is believable only if we posit that Beijing has no aspirations for regional leadership or revisions of the current order beyond gaining control over Taiwan, both now and in the future. The “grand bargain” idea probably resonates less with Beijing than Washington. From Beijing’s point of view, this would be asking it to trade something it believes it already owns for something else it believes it already owns. If they did agree, how the “bargain” would be operationalized is unclear. What would it mean for China to “officially accept” U.S. alliances and military bases in the Asia-Pacific? This would seem to require Beijing to renounce its proudly “principled” opposition to any country having “Cold War era” alliances and foreign bases. At the same time, it is easy to foresee China continuing its pre-bargain activities (military buildup, maneuvers with Russia, naval patrols in the East and South China Sea, etc.) while claiming these were not attempts to drive U.S. influence out of the region. Glaser recognizes that Chinese leaders may intend to push out their U.S. rival. He argues his proposal would answer the question of whether this is Beijing’s plan. If Beijing accepts the proposal, it would indicate that China has limited aims and can tolerate continued U.S. regional hegemony. If not, China intends to usurp that role from the United States. If we now recognize that expelling U.S. strategic leadership may be Beijing’s intention, unilaterally assisting the Chinese by abandoning Taiwan is not the most sensible policy if the US hopes to retain its accustomed role. The timing of Glaser’s proposal is particularly bad given that Xi Jinping’s government seems to represent a shift toward a more assertive Chinese foreign policy that has grown impatient with waiting for the United States to decline on its own. TNI-D7-Article-MRect Even if the current regime in Beijing does not plan to dismantle U.S. regional leadership, the United States cannot be sure the leaders of a future, stronger China will think the same way. China could renege on Glaser’s proposed deal more easily than the US could. China is a local power with relatively short supply lines to the East and South China Seas. In the case of the South China Sea, China enjoys a huge and growing military force projection disparity in its favor relative to the other claimants. But to cancel its part of the deal, the United States would have to cross the Pacific Ocean to invade and capture a Taiwan defended by ensconced PLA forces only 100 miles from China’s mainland. Ultimately, Glaser’s idea founders on the contradiction between assuring China and assuring allies who fear China. Admitting that regional confidence in U.S. reliability would suffer if Washington stopped supporting Taiwan, Glaser argues that Washington would need to compensate for this reputational setback by increasing U.S. military forces in the region, investing in stronger capabilities, and deepening ties between US and allied military commands. These compensatory moves, however, would go a long way toward reviving the very fears that the “grand bargain” was intended to alleviate. It is questionable that China would feel much more secure if the price of gaining control over Taiwan was a permanently stronger US military presence in the region. Glaser’s view of the protection of a democratic Taiwan as superfluous rather than intrinsic to America’s “longstanding military security role in East Asia” is erroneous. Therefore a bargaining away of US support for Taiwan – especially for a doubtful payoff – is no way to strengthen America’s regional leadership.

#### Aff fails to solve, Glaser’s work is flawed

Bellocchi 11 (Nat Bellocchi (former US ambassador and Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. After retiring, Bellocchi closely monitored Taiwan-US relations and regularly wrote opinion pieces for the Taipei Times and its sister newspaper, the Chinese-language Liberty Times, detailing his observations. Nat Bellocchi was also a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group)., “Charles Glaser’s fallacious arguments,” Taipei Times, 7 March 2011, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/03/07/2003497553/1) //mw)

In the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, George Washington University professor Charles Glaser makes the case for the US avoiding conflict with a rising China by backing away from its commitments to Taiwan. In his view, this would remove “the most obvious and contentious flashpoint” and smooth the way for better relations in the decades to come. To be honest, never in my long diplomatic life have I run into a more shortsighted, uninformed and fallacious set of arguments as can be found in Glaser’s essay. Foreign Affairs does itself and its readers a disservice by publishing such a flawed article. For one, Glaser cannot get his facts straight. In the section dealing with the Taiwan issue, he writes: “Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War, more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan part of its homeland.” At what time did the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have control of Taiwan? Any elementary school child in Taiwan can tell us that Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, and then it came under the control of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), on behalf of the Allied Forces. The PRC, which came into existence in 1949, never had any control of Taiwan. A second important issue is whether such appeasement would increase China’s appetite, making Beijing even more demanding. Glaser dismisses such criticism, but in doing so he shows his failure to understand the Chinese psyche: Just like the old dynasties of yesteryear, the Chinese see themselves as the Middle Kingdom. The “rise of China” is a resurrection of the idea that China is the center of civilization and all outside powers should be tributaries. China’s goals are therefore not “limited,” as Glaser mistakenly believes. It would not be “content” with control over Taiwan. stable This brings me to my third point. Glaser thinks that if Taiwan is removed as an irritant in US relations with China, the other differences could be worked out. This is utterly wrong. China sees itself as the new superpower, which is presenting the world with an alternative developmental model — strong economic growth paired with continued tight political control by the central regime. Chinese officials are actively marketing this model. Just look at their support for regimes in Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Do we want that model to prevail, or a system to be based on freedom and democracy? A fourth element that Glaser totally overlooks in his theoretical world of various shades of realism is the fact that over the past decades, Taiwan has developed a set of shared values, which are very similar to the ones the US holds dear. Taiwanese have worked hard for their democracy and believe in a future that is free and democratic — life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. If the US backs away from its commitment to Taiwan, the US backs away from its basic values. That would be a signal not taken lightly in East Asia. The case thus needs to be made that Taiwan is an important element in the US’ strategy to broaden and strengthen freedom and democracy in East Asia. Its transition to democracy only 20 some years ago is a prime example of how people in the world are waking up to the fact that they have a choice. In the Middle East, several countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are going through that tumultuous process right now. Abandoning a country and a people who have achieved freedom and democracy through their own hard work would be a betrayal of everything the US stands for as a nation.